## Message Text

**SECRET** 

PAGE 01 STATE 083695 ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 SSO-00 NSCE-00 USIE-00 INRE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07 IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04 PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05 SIG-01 MMO-01 NRC-05 /090 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/IR:JYOUNG:SHC
APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:LSLOSS
DOD:LMICHAEL
PM: RBARTHOLOMEW
EUR:JHAWES
NSC:WHYLAND
S/S:R. PERITO
INR:RBARAZ
ACDA:MHUMPHREYS

-----140401Z 063307 /61

O R 140143Z APR 77
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY LONDON
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
USNMR SHAPE
USCINCEUR

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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS:PARM, NATO, MBFR

SUBJECT: MBFR: DATA DISAGGREGATION

REFS: A. NATO 1970 (DTG 051800Z APR 77), B. MBFR VIENNA 170 SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 083695

(DTG 011738Z APR 77), C. NATO 1933 (DTG 041748Z APR 77), D. NATO 2095 (DTG 090915Z APR 77), E. STATE 49526 (DTG 051846Z MAR 77), F. STATE 67040 (DTG 252317Z MAR 77)

1. WE HAVE CAREFULLY REVIEWED FRG PROPOSAL (PARA 3, REF A) TO TABLE SUB-TOTALS WHICH CORRESPOND TO EACH SIDE'S REDUCTION APPROACHES, AND TO EXAMINE IN NATO OTHER OPTIONS FOR

DATA DISAGGREGATION INCLUDING AN EXCHANGE ON THE NUMBER OF MAJOR UNITS AND BREAKDOWN BY FUNCTION OF UNITS. WE AGREE WITH DELEGATION'S ANALYSIS OF THE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE GERMAN PROPOSAL (REF B). MOREOVER, WE BELIEVE LINE TAKEN BY NATO IN DISCUSSION OF GERMAN PROPOSAL WITH SCHNELLER (REF C) IS RIGHT ON TARGET. FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW, FIRST PART OF GERMAN PROPOSAL WOULD ESTABLISH A DIRECT LINK BETWEEN DATA EXCHANGE AND EACH SIDE'S REDUCTION APPROACHES, WHICH WOULD ACHIEVE PRECISELY WHAT THE GERMANS WANT TO AVOID: SETTING A PRECEDENT IN THE DATA EXCHANGE FOR A CLOSER RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TECHNICAL WAY WE HANDLE THE DATA DISCUSSION AND THE FINAL FORM OF REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS AND THE CALCULATION OF RESIDUAL FORCES IN THE POST-REDUCTION PERIOD. FURTHERMORE,

WE ARE CONFIDENT THAT FRG PROPOSAL WOULD BE REJECTED BY THE SOVIETS AND WOULD LEAVE US STALEMATED IN THE DATA DISCUSSION WITH NO IMMEDIATE HOPE OF MOVING TOWARD THE PROCESS OF CLARIFYING THE DISCREPANCIES BETWEEN EASTERN DATA AND OUR ESTIMATES OF EASTERN MANPOWER LEVELS.

2. WITH REGARD TO TWO ARGUMENTS MADE BY FRG REPRESENTATIVE AT APRIL 5 SPC (PARA 4, REF A), WE AGREE THAT MOVES IN MBFR MUST BE MADE IN CONTEXT OF GENERAL CLIMATE OF EAST-WEST RELATIONS. WE BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT TABLING OF NATIONAL SUB-TOTALS SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS A "CONCESSION" TO EAST. INDEED, IN OUR VIEW, IT IS A NECESSARY STEP TOWARD CLARIFICATION OF EASTERN AND WESTERN DISCREPANCIES OVER EASTERN DATA. (MISSION MAY DRAW ON POINTS IN REF F AS APPROPRIATE.) WE SEE NO WAY TO AVOID THIS CONCLUSION. WE BELIEVE WEST SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 083695

SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO KEEP DATA DISCUSSION IN "TECHNICAL" FRAMEWORK AND SEPARATED FROM CONCERNS OF "CONCESSIONS" OR "HARDENING OF POSITIONS." SECOND, WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT EASTERN REJECTION OF GERMAN APPROACH---WHICH WE BELIEVE WOULD BE LIKELY RESULT OF NATO DECISION TO FOLLOW FRG SUGGESTION--WOULD TELL US VERY MUCH ABOUT WHETHER EAST WAS SEEKING TO PREJUDICE WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION. WE HAVE NO DOUBT THAT EAST WILL SEEK TO TRANSLATE WESTERN TACTICAL MOVES TO THEIR ADVANTAGE. WE ARE CONFIDENT, NONETHELESS, THAT WE CAN BLUNT SUCH EASTERN EFFORTS WITHOUT ANY DAMAGE TO WESTERN NEGOTIATING POSITION AND DO NOT BELIEVE THAT THIS IS A PERSUASIVE REASON FOR FOLLOWING GERMAN PROPOSED ROUTE.

3. WE DO NOT, HOWEVER, WISH TO GIVE IMPRESSION THAT USG IS TRYING TO "BULLDOZE" GERMANS INTO ACCEPTANCE OF OUR VIEW. WE ALSO RECOGNIZE THAT DISCREPANCY IN DATA MAY NOT BE FULLY EXPLAINED BY NATIONAL DISAGGREGATION AND THAT FURTHER CONSIDERATION OF THIS PROBLEM MAY BE REQUIRED. HOWEVER, WE-

AND APPARENTLY THE OTHER ALLIES AS WELL--ARE PERSUADED THAT NATIONAL DISAGGREGATION IS A REASONABLE NEXT STEP IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AND SHOULD NOT BE DELAYED. WE WILL WANT TO GIVE GERMANS SUFFICIENT TIME TO REFLECT ON OUR ARGUMENTATION WITH A VIEW TOWARD JOINING ALLIED CONSENSUS; US HOPES THAT SUCH A CONSENSUS COULD BE DEVELOPED AT LEAST IN TIME FOR RESUMPTION OF MBFR NEGOTIATIONS IN MAY. IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO REACH CONSENSUS EARLIER, DATA COULD BE EXCHANGED INFORMALLY DURING RECESS BY DESIGNATED ALLY. E.G., BELGIANS OR DUTCH ON OUR SIDE. WE BELIEVE THIS PROCESS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHOUT AWAITING RESULTS OF A NATO STUDY AS DESCRIBED IN REF C. WE ARE NOT PERSUADED THAT SUCH A STUDY WILL PRODUCE A GREATER DEGREE OF CONSENSUS THAN COULD BE ACHIEVED WITHOUT SUCH A STUDY. IF CONSENSUS DEVELOPS IN SUPPORT OF "OPTIONS STUDY," YOU SHOULD RESERVE US POSITION AND REPORT BACK.

4. MISSION IS AUTHORIZED TO DRAW AS IT DEEMS APPROPRIATE SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 04 STATE 083695

ON ABOVE, AS WELL AS SUBSTANTIVE ARGUMENTS IN REFS B AND C TO DESCRIBE US SUPPORT FOR AHG PROPOSAL AND US RESERVATIONS CONCERNING GERMAN COUNTER-PROPOSALS. MISSION SHOULD AVOID, HOWEVER, CONTRIBUTING TO ATMOSPHERE IN SPC MEETING THAT MIGHT LOOK TO GERMANS AS EFFORT TO "BULLDOZE" THE FRG.

- 5. WITH REGARD TO SPC CHAIRMAN'S SUGGESTION TO TABLE US MANPOWER TOTALS UNILATERALLY (PARA 13, REF A), YOU SHOULD BE GUIDED BY APPROACH IN REF E. WE DO NOT BELIEVE SUCH A STEP WOULD LEAD TO SOVIET TABLING OF DATA, AND WE ARE UNWILLING TO TABLE US DATA WITHOUT A PREARRANGED, SIMULTANEOUS EXCHANGE OF US-SOVIET DATA. THEREFORE, WE DO NOT BELIEVE SPC SHOULD PURSUE FURTHER THE CHAIRMAN'S SUGGESTION.
- 6. THROUGHOUT DISCUSSION OF SUBJECT, YOU SHOULD STRESS OUR BELIEF THAT OUR APPROACH TO NATIONAL DISAGGREGATION (SPECIFICALLY, PARA 8, REF F) WILL PROTECT THE WESTERN POSITION, INCLUDING THE PRINCIPLE OF COLLECTIVITY. VANCE

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## Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X

Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am Channel Indicators: n/a

**Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED** 

Concepts: INSTRUCTIONS, DISARMAMENT, POLICIES, MUTUAL FORCE REDUCTIONS

Control Number: n/a

Copy: SINGLE Sent Date: 14-Apr-1977 12:00:00 am Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am Decaption Note:

Disposition Action: RELEASED Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW

Disposition Date: 22 May 2009 Disposition Event:

Disposition Event:
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE083695
Document Source: Core

**Document Unique ID: 00** Drafter: JYOUNG:SHC Enclosure: n/a Executive Order: GS

Errors: N/A **Expiration:** 

Film Number: D770129-0002

Format: TEL From: STATE

Handling Restrictions: n/a

Image Path: ISecure: 1

Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770457/aaaabwzk.tel

Line Count: 159 Litigation Code IDs: Litigation Codes:

Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 243323a5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN ACDA

Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a

Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a Previous Chasification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 77 NATO BRUSSELS 1970, 77 MBFR VIENNA 170

Retention: 0

Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED Review Content Flags: Review Date: 27-Oct-2004 12:00:00 am

Review Event: Review Exemptions: n/a **Review Media Identifier:** Review Release Date: n/a Review Release Event: n/a **Review Transfer Date:** Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a

**SAS ID**: 2804964 Secure: OPEN Status: NATIVE

Subject: MBFR: DATA DISAGGREGATION

TAGS: PARM, US, NATO, MBFR To: NATO BRUSSELS

Type: TE

vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS\_Docs/243323a5-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc

Review Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009

Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009